Unintended consequences in demarketing anti-social behaviour:  project Bernie by Peattie, Kenneth et al.
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/95073/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Peattie, Kenneth, Peattie, Susan and Newcombe, Robert 2016. Unintended consequences in
demarketing anti-social behaviour: project Bernie. Journal of Marketing Management 32 (17-18) ,
pp. 1588-1618. file 
Publishers page: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0267257X.2016.1244556
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0267257X.2016.1244556>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
Unintended consequences in demarketing anti-social behaviour:  
Project Bernie 
 
 
 
Authors. 
 
Professor Ken Peattie,  
Cardiff Business School,  
Cardiff University,   
33 Park Place 
Cardiff, CF10 3BA. 
Email: Peattie@cf.ac.uk 
Tel: 02920 879691 
 
Dr Sue Peattie 
 
Sue Peattie was a Lecturer in Marketing at Cardiff Business School. She died in September 2013. 
 
Professor Robert Newcombe,  
Institute of Primary Care & Public Health,  
Cardiff University School of Medicine, 
Neuadd Meirionnydd, 
Heath Park, 
Cardiff CF14 4YS 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgement:  
This work was partially supported by the ESRC under Grant No: RES-568-28-5001 
 
 
Disclosure statement: The authors have no financial interest or benefit arising from the direct 
applications of their research. 
  
  
2 
 
Unintended consequences in demarketing anti-social behaviour:  
Project Bernie 
  
 
Abstract. 
 
This case study uses an intervention tackling deliberate grassfires to explore the application of 
social marketing in a novel context, its potential effectiveness in demarketing anti-social 
behaviours, and the potential of such interventions to generate positive and negative unintended 
consequences. The intervention’s evaluation confirms social marketing’s potential value in 
tackling ingrained anti-social behaviours within communities. It also revealed unexpected 
benefits accruing from changes within the target community, within the sponsoring fire service 
and in the relationship between the two. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of 
potential unexpected and unplanned consequences for intervention planning, conduct and 
evaluation.  
  
Keywords: Social marketing, anti-social behaviour, unintended consequences, evaluation.  
Statement of contribution: This paper contributes insights into several aspects of social 
marketing. Contextually it considers a relatively novel arena for interventions, fire-related 
behaviours, and contributes to knowledge about community-based interventions aiming to de-
market anti-social behaviours. It furthers our understanding of unintended consequences in social 
marketing and their implications for intervention planning and evaluation.  
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Introduction  
Social marketing’s influence has progressively extended beyond health into a range of 
behaviours linked to safety and injury prevention issues such as seat belt use or tackling domestic 
violence; to environmental issues such as recycling, energy saving or car sharing; and to 
social/community issues such as adult literacy or voter participation (Kotler & Lee, 2008). It has 
also increasingly extended beyond addressing individuals’ behaviour to consider the social and 
community context for behaviour. One such extension is ‘Community Based Social Marketing’, a 
pragmatic approach to social change within specific geographic communities with an emphasis 
on direct contact with community members (McKenzie-Mohr, 2000).  
This paper presents a novel community-based social marketing application by South Wales 
Fire and Rescue Services (SWFRS) in the UK, tackling an unusual and challenging behavioural 
issue, the prevention of deliberate grassland fire-setting around communities in South Wales. The 
project was conducted in partnership with social marketing academics, providing opportunities to 
derive wider lessons from the resulting intervention, some of which inform this paper. The 
background, conduct and evaluation of the intervention are detailed in another paper (Peattie, 
Peattie & Thomas, 2012), developed for a policy audience with an analytical focus on social 
marketing’s public sector management implications. This paper presents an alternative analysis 
for a marketing audience, with a focus on social marketing implications relating to its use in 
tackling anti-social behaviours (ASBs) within communities and the potential for interventions to 
generate unintended consequences. A greater awareness of the scope for unintended 
consequences should aid both academics and practitioners in planning, managing and evaluating 
future interventions.  
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Unintended consequences in social marketing 
Vernon’s (1979) review of the phenomenon of unintended consequences frames them as 
somewhat paradoxical. A recognition that they tend to flow from our actions borders on the 
obvious, yet down the ages they have intrigued writers and philosophers including Hegel, Hume, 
Marx and Sartre, producing a wide range of inferences and conclusions about their causes and 
implications. Vernon highlights a range of factors, beyond simple ignorance or a lack of 
forethought, that can generate unintended consequences. They can arise from: the cumulative 
impact of many peoples’ similar actions crossing causal thresholds; interactions between many 
diverse individual decisions; the sequencing or co-incidence of dissimilar activities by 
individuals or groups; the accidental triggering of some process that intervenes between 
intentions and outcomes; significant changes in the context in which action takes place; and the 
sheer complexity of cause-and-effect relationships within social systems defeating our ability to 
accurately predict outcomes.  
In the context of planned social interventions, the sociologist Robert Merton in 1936 first 
argued that all types of interventions will have unintended consequences, some that can be 
foreseen and, if undesirable, possibly prevented, and others that cannot. He recommended that all 
interventions should be routinely evaluated for unintended consequences allowing for 
intervention modification or even termination should they generate significant problems. Morell 
(2005) further explains that such consequences vary in the degree to which they are 
unforeseeable as well as unforeseen, and can also include those that are known but deliberately 
‘overlooked’ for political or ideological reasons. Both Merton and Morell acknowledge that not 
all unintended consequences are harmful but that these receive the most attention, and most 
subsequent commercial and social marketing discussion on the subject emphasises the negative. 
For social marketing this reflects the broader use of contingency planning in public policy 
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settings, which has been criticized for a tendency to over-emphasise the negative (Bloom & 
Menefee, 1994). 
Commercially there are certain products, such as automobiles or alcohol, and certain target 
markets, such as children, for which unintended consequences are frequently discussed. 
However, as Fry and Polonsky (2004a, p.1305) note: ‘The majority of products and services are 
marketed in an environment where the unintended consequences of marketing activities are 
simply not considered during the corporate strategic decision making process’. Academic 
discussion of unintended marketing consequences is mostly concentrated within macromarketing 
(see Layton, 2014), or within occasional conference streams or journal special issues (for 
example Journal of Business Research 57/11 from which Fry and Polonsky’s article comes). To 
appreciate unintended consequences Fry and Polonsky (2004a) argue for a broadening in 
marketers’ perspective beyond direct consumer-firm exchanges and their outcomes (including 
traditionally considered externalities) to include the goals, interactions and welfare of all 
stakeholder groups. This involves interrogating the whole value chain including pre and post-
production activities to ask questions like:  
…how might automating production processes impact on employees within an 
organisation? Or how might the marketing of credit cards to youth (a major target segment 
in the United States) encourage consumption behaviour well beyond their means. More 
recently, in Australia, it has become a novelty to place ‘‘scratchies’’ (instant lottery-type 
tickets) in potato crisp packets with prizes that include large sums of money. How might 
such a marketing strategy encourage gambling among children?                                            
(Fry & Polonsky, 2004a, p. 1305) 
Unintended consequences also form a point of intersection between commercial and social 
marketing partly because the latter, when applied as a form of critical marketing, has the potential 
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to help understand the unintended consequences of the former (Gordon, Carrigan & Hastings, 
2011). Hoek (2004) illustrates that one result of tighter tobacco promotion regulation has been to 
make tobacco marketers more innovative, but another unintended (and ironic) outcome is that 
social marketers have then started adopting the effective new marketing tactics developed by 
tobacco marketers to fight back against them. 
Since social marketers specifically seeks to generate purposive social change, one might 
expect them to be more concerned than their commercially-minded peers about the nature and 
role of unintended consequences. The topic has periodically been discussed within the social 
marketing literature (e.g. Brace-Govan, 2015; Dholakia, 1984; Spotswood, French, Tapp & 
Stead, 2011; Knerr, 2011; Pechmann & Slater, 2005) and leading texts highlight the potential for 
negative unintended consequences as an ethical risk within interventions, and the need to 
consider and guard against them (e.g. Donovan & Henley, 2010, p. 211-214; Kotler & Lee, 2008, 
p. 261 & 336). Some commentators have even proposed that social marketing has the potential to 
reduce the incidence of negative unintended consequences for social change programmes 
compared to more traditional approaches (Kotler & Lee, 2009; McDonald, Slavin, Bailie & 
Schobben, 2011). Others argue that a failure to consider interventions’ unintended consequences 
is a shortcoming of the social marketing discipline (Kleinman, 2010; Langford & Panter-Brick, 
2013; Pechmann & Slater, 2005). Brace-Govan (2015, p.107) argues that this failure has led to:  
…a dearth of critical, published social marketing that reviews its own performance as a 
social actor and influencer of social norms with the intention of improving its contribution 
to our quality of life. Especially lacking is critically derived research that aims to support 
social marketing in avoiding inadvertent uncalculated effects that result in reluctance, 
counternormative uptake, stigma or discrimination.  
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There are three notable points about the social marketing literature concerning unintended 
consequences. Firstly although many marketing processes are acknowledged as generating them, 
including innovation, product development, promotional incentives and relationship management 
(Fry & Polonsky, 2004b), the focus is largely on communication efforts and adverse or 
‘boomerang’ effects of messages (Pechmann & Slater, 2005). Pechmann and Slater (2005) 
identify three groups of unintended responses to social marketing messages: 
 (a) counterinformative effects, that unintentionally reduce perceived risks or perceived 
benefits of a behaviour, or alienate the audience by ‘stating the obvious’. Stroud (2015) for 
example suggests that the popularity of social marketing in health, and its reliance on 
communication initiatives, has acted to desensitise people through ‘message fatigue’;  
(b) backlash effects, in response to an authoritarian, non-credible spokesperson or an over-
reliance on fear appeals (see also Hastings, Stead & Webb, 2004). Bird and Tapp (2008) 
observe that attempts to engage teenage audiences via social marketing messages intended 
as ‘cool’ frequently achieve the opposite; 
(c) inherent problems with social marketing messages, caused by implying a behaviour is 
prevalent and therefore ‘normal’ by focussing a campaign on it, or promoting offsetting 
behaviours, such as car drivers having been persuaded to wear seatbelts tending to then 
drive faster because they feel safer.  
Thus well-intentioned messages risk being at least partially counterproductive if they 
desensitize their audience, generate either fatalism or exaggerated levels of anxiety, negatively 
impact non-target audiences or normalise or glamorise the target behaviour (Cho & Salmon, 
2007; Donovan & Henley, 2010; Henley & Donovan, 1999). Intervention segmentation and 
targeting decisions can also result in unintended exclusions, an over-emphasis on the target’s 
lifestyle, a neglect of social context’s importance, ‘victim blaming’ behaviours and potential 
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stigmatizing effects from labelling groups as needing to change (Brenkert, 2002; Bloom & 
Novelli, 1981; Donovan & Henley, 2010; Grier & Bryant, 2005; and Gurrieri, Previte & Brace-
Govan, 2012). Even a successful message may have undesirable side-effects, for example by 
shifting social norms in ways that stigmatize those who face barriers to joining in with the 
promoted behaviour change (Langford & Panter-Brick, 2013). 
Secondly, most salutary examples of unintended negative consequences come from 
conventional health communication, not social marketing per se. The 15 studies of ‘social 
marketing messages’ categorised by Pechmann and Slater (2005) to illustrate their framework are 
all health communication campaigns reported within health journals, not social marketing 
campaigns as defined by Stead, Gordon, Angus & Dermott’s (2007) systematic review criteria, or 
the National Social Marketing Centre’s Benchmark Criteria, (French & Blair-Stevens, 2007).  
Finally, existing social marketing studies on unintended consequences are restricted in 
scale and relatively narrow in scope (Smith, 2006), focusing on negative unintended 
consequences for the intervention’s targets and on their behaviour and wellbeing. Smith (2001) 
highlights that interventions may reach an audience beyond the intended one, resulting in 
unintended consequences, for example creating anxiety amongst the relatives of smokers targeted 
by a ‘fear appeal’ message (Donovan & Henley, 2010). As Fry and Polonsky (2004a) argue, 
unintended marketing consequences cannot be fully understood by just considering the dyadic 
and exchange focussed marketer/customer relationship. In social marketing a key step towards 
considering a broader range of stakeholders comes through a growing focus on ‘upstream’ social 
marketing influences, those (often institutional) stakeholders whose behaviours can influence 
those of the ‘downstream’ consumers targeted by interventions (Donovan & Henley, 2010; 
Kotler & Lee, 2008). However, as Newton, Newton & Rep (2016) detail, the analysis of 
upstream stakeholder impact has often also been myopic, ignoring the potential for 
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interdependence and interaction between upstream actors and the potential for them to be 
influenced in turn by downstream actors, both forms of interaction that could generate unintended 
consequences. 
Much of the wider literature considering unintended consequences position them as 
symptomatic of complex systems featuring multiple stakeholders, multiple interacting processes, 
nonlinear interactions and rich cross-linkages, and for which specifying all relevant variables may 
be impossible (Dorner, 1996; Morell, 2005; Tenner, 1996). These are exactly the types of 
challenging context that social marketers work within, as explored in the context of obesity by 
Duane, Domegan, McHugh and Devaney (2016) and Venturini (2016). Over time a number of 
authors have argued for the need for social marketers to apply more holistic perspectives in 
understanding, managing and evaluating interventions. Dholakia (1984) stresses the need to 
complement traditional micro-social marketing with a more macro-social marketing approach 
that considers the collective consequences of interventions, partly in order to anticipate and 
respond to unintended consequences (see also Brace-Govan, 2015). Cherrier and Gurrieri (2014) 
argue for conceiving social marketing interventions as dynamic systems of interaction between 
the downstream targets, the upstream institutional stakeholders and the ‘midstream’ social 
influences of family and friends. More recently Duane et al. (2016) and Newton et al. (2016) 
have proposed new ways of envisaging interventions in terms of systems thinking approaches, 
actor-network theory or webs, chains and networks of influence to better appreciate the full range 
of stakeholders potentially influencing, and impacted by, an intervention. 
Overall the social marketing literature speaks about the importance of considering and 
guarding against unintended consequences arising from interventions, whilst saying relatively 
little about the nature of such consequences and how management processes might approach 
them. Several reasons may underpin this. It could reflect narrowness in evaluation processes and 
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a failure to seek out unintended outcomes, or journal editors being unwilling to publish null 
results (Pechmann & Slater, 2005). It may represent a desire for accounts of interventions in 
journal papers or project reports to portray them as successful, with things ‘going as planned’ 
viewed as one measure of their success. Even observed positive unintended outcomes could be 
excluded from accounts of interventions, due to concerns about journal space restrictions or 
editor and reviewer reactions to descriptions of  ‘side-effects’ that might be poorly understood or 
viewed as a ‘distraction’ from the core narrative. This paper therefore seeks to present a detailed 
exploration of the unintended consequences of an intervention, and to consider their broader 
implications for social marketing. 
 
The intervention context: The social demarketing of an anti-social behaviour 
The literature on social marketing interventions addressing social/community behaviours mostly 
emphasises the promotion of pro-social behaviours (like voter participation or community 
volunteering). However, social marketing can also demarket behaviours such as smoking or 
substance abuse (Bloom & Novelli, 1981) through ‘strategies attempting to influence individuals 
and/or organizations to decrease or stop doing behaviours that harm themselves, others, or the 
environment’ (Woodside, 2008 p. 459). ASB is a significant area in which demarketing strategies 
can be applied. ASB, for the purposes of law, is defined by the UK Government in the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998 as ‘Acting in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or 
distress to one or more persons not of the same household’. Such behaviours create public 
concern and a significant social cost. A one day snapshot of ASB in England and Wales revealed 
66,000 reported incidents with direct costs to English and Welsh agencies of at least £14m, 
equating to around £3.4 billion a year (Harradine, Kodz, Lemetti & Jones, 2004). These figures 
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also exclude the wider ‘social’ costs of ASB suffered by victims, communities and the 
environment. 
The Home Office (Harradine, et al., 2004) provide a typology of more specific acts to guide 
practitioners under the headings of Misuse of Public Space (e.g. street drinking), Disregard for 
Community/Personal Wellbeing (e.g. noise), Acts Directed at People (e.g. verbal abuse) and 
Environmental Damage (e.g. vandalism). ASBs that harm others within the community are 
potential candidates for social demarketing efforts, and past campaigns have targeted graffiti, 
bullying, street drinking, littering and aggressive driving (Donovan & Henley, 2010; Kotler & 
Lee, 2008; Lloyd, Tafoya & Merritt, 2015; Woodside, 2008). The practical potential of social 
marketing to tackle ASBs however appears to be under-appreciated by policy-makers compared 
to its use in health. Social marketing goes unmentioned in the UK Government’s Committee of 
Public Accounts report on ‘Tackling Anti-Social Behaviours’ (CPA, 2007), in practitioner guides 
to tackling ASB (Armitage, 2002: Martin, Hart, MacLeod & Kinder, 2010; Nixon & Hunter, 
2006) and in studies of the UK government’s progress in addressing ASB (Hodgkinson, 2011). 
A perusal of the social marketing literature suggests that, compared to studies of 
demarketing campaigns for negative health behaviours, campaigns to demarket ASBs are also 
under-represented. They are not explicitly recognized in Truong’s (2014) systematic review of 
the literature, and amongst the Home Office’s more than 60 types of ASB across 17 categories, 
relatively few, such as street drinking (e.g. Bellis & Hughes, 2011; Lloyd , Tafoya & Merritt, 
2015; Russell-Bennet, Rundle-Thiele, Leo & Dietrich, 2013), have been the subject of reported 
social marketing interventions. ASBs impacting others are more commonly referred to as a side-
effect of other socially undesirable behaviours impacting the individual or family (such as 
drinking or other substance abuse), than as the focus of interventions in themselves (see for 
example Bellis & Hughes, 2011 or Hastings & Angus, 2011). This might be partly explained by 
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the fact that most ASBs are also illegal, prompting policy makers to address them through 
regulation and enforcement, and deterring those involved in the behaviour from engaging with 
social marketing programmes that identify them as perpetrators. The UK policy response to ASB 
relies heavily on enforcement strategies such as anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs), parenting 
orders and dispersal orders supplemented by some support network initiatives such as Family 
Intervention Projects. Hodgkinson (2011) notes that there has been little governmental attempt to 
evaluate the effectiveness of enforcement based ASB strategies, and in her own evaluation study 
of the effectiveness of ASB ‘taskforces’ found that ‘the increasingly enforcement-led approach of 
these teams failed to deliver any significant reductions in neighbourhood levels of anti-social 
behaviour’ (p.289). This study concerns the demarketing of a particular anti-social and illegal 
behaviour within a community, and so contributes to our knowledge about the potential of such 
interventions. 
Social marketing for fire services 
Fire services seem an unlikely candidate for social marketing given their associations with 
emergency response situations providing little scope for ‘customer’ input. However, the mission 
of UK Fire Services has gradually focused more on prevention and safety rather than emergency 
response (Bains, Lyon & Young, 2002). Fire prevention concerns behavioural change relating to 
the installation and maintenance of smoke detectors and fire extinguishers, promotion of fire 
safety plans, and safe use of cookers, cigarettes and candles. ASBs are also of interest to fire 
services related to fire setting, vehicle arson, firework misuse and hoax calls. For SWFRS 70% of 
their calls were estimated to result from ASB. Therefore a clear potential exists for social 
marketing’s application to fire-related behaviours, something discussed in detail as early as 2001 
in the context of New Zealand’s fire service (McDermott Miller, 2001). Despite this promising 
potential, the only documented social marketing intervention (as defined by the criteria used in 
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Stead et al.’s (2007) systematic review, or the NSMC Benchmark Criteria (French & Blair-
Stevens, 2007) found by the authors when scoping this intervention, concerned smoke alarm 
installation (Camit, 2002). Although there are examples of fire services acting as stakeholders 
linked to social marketing campaigns for smoke-free homes, safe driving habits or male health, 
fire-related behaviours remains a comparatively unstudied territory for social marketing. 
Social demarketing of rural fire-setting 
Deliberate fire-setting of countryside rather than buildings poses a threat to communities in many 
countries, particularly those subject to drought (Prins, 1994).  Such fires represent an increasingly 
serious problem in the UK and an under-researched phenomenon (McMorrow, 2009). Despite a 
relatively wet climate, deliberate fire-setting on mountainside and rural-urban fringe grassland 
poses significant problems for certain South Wales Valleys’ communities. From 2003-2009 the 
region covered by SWFRS suffered an annual average of 3,592 such deliberate grassfires, costing 
around £7 million annually to deal with (Peattie, et al., 2012).   
Evidence from the scenes of these fires show that they are typically started by disposable 
lighters igniting the previous season’s dried bracken and wild grasses. The resulting fires can 
spread rapidly endangering firefighters and the public (both directly and by tying up SWFRS 
resources), putting property at risk, endangering livestock, and destroying forestry, wildlife and 
their habitats (Quinn, 2009). Consequences in recent years have included the destruction of 
electricity supplies to 30 homes and a fire that only narrowly avoided a requirement to evacuate a 
local hospital. They also impact the daily quality of life in communities through smoke, the 
depressing visual impact of burnt countryside, and through perceived risk and fear linked to 
incidents.   
Setting fires (not directed at specific persons or property) is an example of an ASB under 
the Home Office’s ‘Typology of ASB’ (Harradine, et al., 2004) as a behaviour with ‘Disregard 
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for Community/Personal Wellbeing (subsection: Nuisance)’ although in the case of grassfires 
they also create environmental damage. The pre-existing policy response to fire-setting in the 
region was focussed on improving equipment and operational procedures to make the emergency 
response more effective, combined with school-based educational efforts promoting fire safety 
and discouraging fire-setting. This had not led to a measurable reduction in incidents. Fire-setting 
was therefore chosen by SWFRS for a pilot social marketing intervention developed in 
partnership with social marketing academics, and a range of stakeholder organisations. 
 
Methodology 
With its emphasis on practical problem solving, working through a structured planning process, 
researcher involvement in practitioner workgroups and reporting to the sponsoring organisation, 
this study represents action research, as framed for marketing by Carson, Gilmore, Gronhaug and 
Perry (2001). It also included the action learning and case research elements of Perry and 
Gummeson’s (2004) concept of ‘marketing action research’ although the social marketing 
context makes it less narrowly focused on issues of customers and competitors. The academic 
partners were centrally involved in the development and implementation of the intervention and 
its evaluation. The intervention’s development is described in detail by Peattie et al. (2012), but 
key points worth noting here include:  
 It was supported by a range of stakeholders beyond SWFRS including an International 
Advisory Board of social marketing experts and a Project Stakeholder Group representing 
local organisations including local government, the local Community Safety Partnership 
(CSP), the Police, the Forestry Commission, Tonypandy Community College and two 
major local businesses. These stakeholders also assisted in securing research participants; 
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 It involved a twelve month scoping phase to understand the behaviour through 
documentary analysis, key respondent semi-structured interviews, ‘customer’ interviews 
with local children and their families, and key stakeholder focus groups; 
 Five progress reports linked to different project stages and the dialogue with the Advisory 
Board and Stakeholder Group provided a series of reflections, from which lessons from 
the action research could be derived;  
 Evaluation involved analysis of SWFRS fire data, pre- and post-intervention questionnaires 
and follow-up stakeholder interviews.  
The qualitative research, including interviews and focus groups, provided the bulk of insights 
on which the intervention was developed and provide most of the insights presented in this paper.  
Organisational interviewees included a range of local firefighters from the Station Commander 
through to part-time reserve firefighters, and representatives from the Forestry Commission and 
Police. CSP members, particularly those already involved in educational and outreach initiatives, 
including youth workers and others involved with young people and the local community, were 
also interviewed. All interviews were semi-structured, between 40 and 90 minutes in length, 
conducted by trained interviewers. The focus groups, involving between seven and twelve 
participants, were conducted by trained moderators and lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. Sessions 
involved Tonypandy Community College pupils (aged 12-13 years); junior school children (aged 
10-11 years); parents whose children were 7-17 years; Grandparents / parents of older children; 
members of a local youth group (aged 14-16 years); Young Firefighters (aged 13-17 years); Scouts 
(aged 11-14 years); Girl Guides (aged 11-14 years); and Staff at the local McDonalds. 
Organisational interviewees were informed of the subject of the interview beforehand, but 
focus group participants were only told that the subject was an important community issue 
(although in a tight-knit community there was inevitably some ‘leakage’ so that some participants 
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in later focus groups knew what to expect). All interview and focus groups were digitally 
recorded and transcribed, and transcripts were initially reviewed manually by the academic 
partners to identify and isolate recurring themes and potentially significant insights. Those 
insights from the qualitative research judged to be potentially significant were presented for 
scrutiny to the International Advisory Board (via the initial scoping report), the Project 
Stakeholder Group, and the project’s Youth Advisory Panel (whose role is explained below).  
Intervention objectives 
SWFRS fire incident data showed a strong seasonal effect, with grassfires peaking around the 
fortnight’s Easter school holiday. Partly this reflected optimal burning conditions prior to new 
season growth, but it also suggested that school-age youngsters were centrally involved. Starting 
fires was an illegal ASB, but its classification by the Home Office as a type that constituted a 
‘nuisance’ also potentially confused the issue for the agencies involved since that term is usually 
applied to sub-criminal behaviour (Hodgkinson & Tilley, 2011). Although it represents a ‘Fire 
Crime’ for SWFRS, it did not feature in police performance targets and was assigned a low 
priority, leading to an absence of previous arrests, prosecutions or data. This meant SWFRS had 
no firm information about perpetrators’ identity, characteristics or motivations.  
Analysis of data for the previous six years revealed two communities where the problem 
was most acute, Tonypandy and Aberdare. They had similar numbers of deliberate grassfires 
year-on-year. The primary intervention goal chosen was to reduce the numbers of deliberate 
grassfires in the Tonypandy target area by 15% during the fortnight’s Easter vacation period (26 
March – 12 April 2010), using nearby Aberdare as a control (to account for variations linked to 
weather or other external factors). This target was selected on the advice of the Advisory Board 
as one that represented an attainable yet challenging shift in a behaviour ingrained within a 
community. The subsidiary objectives were (a) to promote socially positive behaviours and limit 
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or remove opportunities for negative behaviours that could lead to deliberate fire-setting; and (b) 
to encourage and support key professionals and organisations in adopting a holistic and 
coordinated approach to combat fire-setting.  
 
Into the unexpected: Scoping insights 
A criticism of some social marketing programmes is their focus on individual problematic 
behaviours within communities (in this case fire-setting) rather than the underlying causes such 
as boredom, social isolation or low social capital (Spotswood et al., 2011). This can lead to 
ineffective one-dimensional solutions. The findings of the primary research (reported in more 
detail in Peattie et al. (2012)) highlighted that fire-setting’s causes were multi-dimensional. 
Unexpectedly it proved to be less a symptom of social disaffection, and was instead seen as a 
local social norm and tradition stretching back through three generations (although with the 
behaviour’s local roots as a form of protest in response to land governance changes in the 1970s 
having been largely forgotten). Although technically an ASB, it was unexpectedly revealed to be 
perceived as joining in with the community rather than reacting against it. It was also more 
predictably partly a response to boredom and a thirst for (modest) risk-taking and excitement 
without perceived serious consequences amongst the young, and partly a reflection of 
misconceptions about the consequences of the behaviour and a sense of disconnection from their 
local environment. The development of the social marketing intervention therefore needed to be 
equally multi-dimensional.  
 The boredom dimension was supported by the skewing of the behaviour towards Sundays 
and the Easter school holidays. The planned intervention therefore targeted the age groups most 
involved in the fire-setting behaviour by offering alternative activities, many with an element of 
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risk and excitement, during the main fire-setting period. This was supported by targeted 
enforcement as a control measure to raise the perceived ‘cost’ of involvement in fire-setting and 
educational efforts to encourage youngsters to value their local environment more. The ultimate 
aim was to break the traditional annual cycle of fire-setting as a social norm.  
Intervention targeting 
A firm conclusion from the formative research was that fire-setting mostly involved teenagers 
and some younger children. The primary target audience chosen was 13-16 year olds living and 
studying in the Tonypandy area because they were perceived as socially independent from their 
parents, still subject to peer pressure, and with the potential to be role models (both negative and 
positive) for younger children.  There were also fewer health and safety barriers to overcome 
with this age group when providing diversionary activities with an element of risk (explained 
below). The secondary target audience was other youngsters and parents within the Tonypandy 
area.  
 
Concern about unintended consequences and working with children 
The focus on children raised immediate concerns about unintended consequences, since social 
science research involving children within a community inevitably raises ethical issues relating to 
access, consent and negative unintended consequences such as stigmatization (for a detailed 
exploration see Tinson, 2009; and Walsh, Hewson, Shier & Morales, 2008). Such concerns about 
ethics and consequences were tackled in two ways. Firstly, researching local children’s opinions, 
beliefs and behaviours was undertaken by recruiting and training community youth-workers who 
were known to, and trusted by, the children. As researchers they were much more likely to solicit 
an honest and open response than unfamiliar academics or representatives from SWFRS or the 
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police given the focus on an illegal ASB. Secondly, from the development phase onwards the 
project sought to co-create the intervention with local children to both pursue effectiveness and 
avoid unintended consequences linked to stigmatization.  
Co-creating the intervention: The Youth Advisory Panel 
Involving young people at all stages of an ASB prevention is acknowledged as important (Martin 
et al., 2010), and therefore a strong element of co-creation was incorporated in the intervention. 
Although the vocabulary of co-creation wasn’t used in the campaign, much of the campaign 
illustrated the types of co-creation processes and benefits discussed by Domegan, Collins, Stead, 
McHugh and Hughes (2013). This included establishing a ‘Youth Advisory Panel’ of eight 
youngsters (split evenly between the sexes) aged 13 to 16 attending Tonypandy Community 
College to shape and promote the intervention. Its members were identified by the college as 
popular and/or influential with their peers and therefore in a position to represent and potentially 
influence them. They provided a sounding board for all elements of the intervention, from 
interpretation of the research findings to planning the practicalities of the intervention, to ensure 
that they resonated with local youngsters. This helped to switch the nature of the research 
element of the project from being what Powell (2011) describes as research ‘on’ children to 
becoming research ‘with’ children. The intervention also used the insights from youngsters in the 
pre-intervention questionnaires to select and plan the ‘diversionary’ activities that formed a key 
intervention component.  
 
 
 
 
Co-Creating the Bernie brand. 
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The campaign branding was also created by the local children through a competition held by 
SWFRS’s Print and Design Team. This was given a high profile within the college with attractive 
prizes and a special awards ceremony, resulting in 63 entries from pupils aged 12 to 17. The 
Youth Advisory Panel worked with SWFRS graphic designers to judge entries and select the best 
artwork and slogan (including the need for a suitable Welsh language version, the ability for it to 
translate into a graphic, and acceptability to all stakeholders). The winning design featuring a 
sheep was from a group of 4 girls aged 16/17, while the winning slogan was from a girl aged 15 
of ‘Grass is green Fire is mean’. After much deliberation the Youth Advisory Panel named the 
sheep mascot ‘Bernie’, partly because its rather subtle word play highlighted the relevance to 
fire-setting, and Bernie’s final form is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Bernie became the face and identity for the project and he (or she, there is still an ongoing 
debate amongst project stakeholders) appeared on posters, the website, Facebook and other 
marketing materials. The origin of the visuals and campaign slogans, the following of childrens’ 
own suggestions in creating diversionary activities, and the involvement of local firefighters and 
youth workers in the activities helped to avoid the appearance of an intervention designed and 
managed by experts rather than by the participants and local community (Domegan et al., 2013; 
Stead, Arnott & Dempsey, 2013). The co-creation element was continued through a Bernie 
website and Facebook page which received 160 requests to be ‘friends’ in the first six hours, and 
allowed a humorous but informative dialogue with local youngsters to be maintained throughout 
the campaign. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Bernie poster.  
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                     (Courtesy of SWFRS) 
The Intervention  
The intervention, designed using SWFRS statistical data, insights from the focus groups and 
interviews, and co-created with the children, utilised French, Blair-Stevens, McVey & Merritt’s 
(2009) De-CIDES behavior framework to create a ‘Strategic Social Marketing Mix’ integrating 
five types of influence (explored in more detail in Peattie, et al., 2012): 
Support: A 16 day programme of constructive diversionary activities for youngsters during the 
Easter school holidays and rewards for involvement (in the shape of a certificate and a customised 
‘hoodie’), organised with an emphasis on replacing some of the needs that fire-setting addressed 
like tackling boredom and generating moderate risks;   
Control: high visibility SWFRS vehicles patrolled areas of known incidence at peak fire times 
backed by improved use of local CCTV resources. Closer cooperation with the police led to the 
first arrests and prosecutions for grassfire setting as a fire crime;  
Design: the behavioural environment was changed by encouraging local retailers to refrain from 
selling disposable lighters or matches to youngsters during the campaign and the Forestry 
Commission committed to reducing flammable material like woodcuttings on their land; 
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Education: Many diversionary activities had an educational element linked to communicating the 
anti-fire-setting message, it provided the theme for a College drama project scripted by students 
and filmed to create an educational resource for younger children; 
Information: Event launches, social media, posters in schools and communities, local media 
coverage and communication through project partners were all used to raise community 
awareness of Bernie.  
This framework differs from the traditional 4P mix model which has many inherent 
weaknesses (Constantinides, 2006) and may cause problems for social marketers arising from the 
differences between commercial and social contexts (Peattie & Peattie, 2003). It also had the 
advantage of greater perceived consonance with existing SWFRS structures, strategies and 
vocabularies compared to concepts like ‘product’ or ‘price’. It also clearly emphasised to 
stakeholders (including SWFRS and CSP members) that the intervention was complementary to, 
and integrated with, existing measures based around education and enforcement, rather than a 
new, separate and alternative approach that could have unintentionally appeared to be in 
competition with, or implicitly critical of, pre-existing efforts. This helped to avoid some of the 
risks of non-cooperation (as an unintended consequence) that can afflict social marketing 
campaigns being introduced into organisations not used to such approaches (Polit, 2012). 
 
Intervention effectiveness 
Evaluation is acknowledged as very important, yet often a weak link, in social marketing 
interventions (Biroscak et al., 2014; Brace-Govan, 2015; Lister & Merritt, 2013), which may not 
lend themselves to the ‘gold standard’ of randomised trials or other experimental designs (Grier 
& Bryant, 2005). Evaluation is also a perceived weakness in ASB prevention initiatives where 
  
23 
 
systematic collation of local data and evaluation of outcomes in terms of impact on communities 
and reduction of ASB have been weak (Hodgkinson & Tilley, 2011). 
Evaluating the effectiveness of Bernie was simplified because details of all fire incidents 
attended by SWFRS are logged, including their type. However, simply comparing grassfire 
incidence with previous years would not suffice since weather conditions create annual 
fluctuations. This was overcome by using Aberdare, the other high incidence community, as a 
control. It is topographically similar to Tonypandy, geographically close but not adjacent, and has 
a similar socio-economic profile and social history. The two communities had similar numbers of 
fires annually (87 on average for Tonypandy 2004-2009 and 92 for Aberdare), and although the 
absolute numbers varied between years with weather, the two communities followed similar 
patterns of highs and lows. Using a control allowed for a rigorous evaluation of the fire data 
during the intervention period, which is presented in Table 1 along with data for the preceding six 
years for comparison.  
Simple inspection of the data suggests that the Bernie intervention had a positive impact. 
Whilst in the fortnight prior to the Easter holidays Tonypandy was running ahead of Aberdare 
(and the historical trend) in fire incidents (28 compared to 21), once Bernie’s Easter holiday 
activities were underway, Tonypandy dropped to 11 fires compared to Aberdare’s 19. In the very 
dry fortnight after the Easter holiday, Tonypandy increased to 25 compared to a jump in 
Aberdare to 84. Ratio analysis allows us to quantify this impact. Dividing the ratio of fire 
incidence during those six weeks in 2010 (64/124) by the historical trend (523/552) produces an 
adjusted ratio of 0.545. The estimated benefit was calculated using a method developed by 
Miettinen and Nurminen (1985) for calculating confidence intervals for odds ratios when 
comparing two data sets. This allowed confidence intervals to be calculated showing that for the 
entire six week intervention period (2 weeks pre, during and post Easter) the best (i.e. most 
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likely) estimate of benefit is that Tonypandy had 46% fewer fires during those 6 weeks than 
would be expected on the basis of fires in Aberdare in 2010 and in both areas during the 
preceding six years (with 25% and 61% representing the lower and upper limits for probable fire 
reduction at the 95% confidence level). This was achieved during a 6 week period in which, for 
the unitary authority as a whole, the number of fires had increased from 429 in 2009 to 633 in 
2010. A chi-square hypothesis test yielded X2 = 14.96, p<0.001, indicating strong evidence to reject a 
null hypothesis that the intervention made no difference (see Table 1).  Follow-up data also showed 
that the incidence of fires in the Tonypandy area continued to be significantly reduced by an 
average of 37% during the six months following the intervention compared to past trends and in 
comparison to Aberdare. Further cost benefit analysis details are provided in Peattie et al. (2012). 
For the secondary behavioural goal of promoting more positive social behaviours amongst 
youngsters, quantitative research was used. Baseline data was collected on knowledge, attitudes 
and behaviours of young people in both communities via questionnaires (1517 in total). These 
were administered to 11 to 15 year olds in Tonypandy Community College, and Aberdare’s Girls 
and Boys Schools. A pre-intervention questionnaire was distributed in early March 2010 and a 
post-intervention survey was administered in May 2010 to measure changes. In Tonypandy, 1 in 
6 youngsters had taken part in at least one Bernie activity and 66% of all youngsters agreed that 
there had been ‘more to do this Easter’ (compared to just under 5% who felt that applied in 
Aberdare). There was also increased awareness about grassfires as a problem for the community, 
their impacts, and the need to tackle them. Feedback about the activities involving the firefighters 
(such as bushcraft skills, abseiling and ‘Firefighter for a day’) showed that they helped in 
building links with the youngsters.   
After the successful 2010 Bernie campaign, it was extended to a further three unitary 
authorities with an expanded range of stakeholder partners. Data for the 2011 intervention’s 
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impact is less statistically rigorous than for 2010 due to different statistical evaluation methods 
used across the four authorities and the absence of a control. However, April 2011 was the hottest 
and driest on record, and the UK as a whole suffered an increase in the number of deliberate 
grassfires compared to 2010. During the six week Bernie period for 2011 SWFRS, by contrast, 
experienced a 27% reduction in fires compared to 2010. The four (out of ten) Unitary Authorities 
in which Bernie ran contributed 74% of that reduction. Bernie’s effectiveness was also 
recognised in the ‘Chartered Institute of Public Relations Excellence in Communications 
Awards’ for 2011 by winning the Public Sector category. Bernie has continued to run annually 
since, and by the second and third years the academic involvement had reduced to only follow-up 
evaluation work, with the practitioners taking over all aspects of managing the ongoing 
intervention. 
  
Unintended consequences. 
The Bernie intervention was perceived as successful in achieving both its primary and subsidiary 
objectives, but evaluation efforts also revealed additional unintended consequences. There is an 
argument that social marketing interventions will be prone to unexpected developments and 
unintended consequences, particularly when they emphasise co-creation, simply because the 
customer and data-led nature of the interventions is likely to take the ‘experts’ in the sponsoring 
organisations out of their familiar comfort zone. As the SWFRS Bernie Project Manager 
commented:  
Nobody at the beginning of this project, nobody would ever have said we would have
 been producing hoodies and giving them out to people around the valleys and even when 
 we did, everybody said that it isn’t going to work, that it’s the wrong thing to do but it’s 
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 been a great success, in fact one of the biggest successes. And nobody would ever have 
 said we were going to come up with this cartoon character of a sheep (or rather the 
 young people come up with it), and I think that’s proved that there are things out there 
 that we don’t know. 
One reason that unintended consequences may be a challenge for social marketers is the 
lack of practical tools to draw upon to understand, evaluate and manage them. Both Merton 
(1936) and Vernon (1979) offer relatively complex lists of the potential sources of unintended 
consequences, but these don’t easily translate into prescriptions for action. An opportunity to 
develop a simple planning tool comes from the observation that unintended consequences can 
include both positive and negative developments, and a mixture of the foreseeable and 
unforeseen (Morell, 2005). This simplifies a reality in which outcomes can be a mixed blessing, 
and in which predictability is represented by a continuum rather than two ‘pure’ categories 
(Morell, 2005), but it allows for the creation of a simple two-by-two matrix (see Figure 2), and a 
four-way typology, of unintended consequences.  
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This typology can be illustrated with the following types of unintended consequences 
considered before, during or after the Bernie intervention: 
Type 1. Bonuses (Positive/Foreseeable)  
These are not the planned benefits against which intervention success will be measured, but are 
hoped for or logically foreseeable spin-off benefits. Bernie used 'distraction' activities for 
youngsters to discourage fire-setting as a core element of the intervention. The potential for these 
to distract youngsters from other forms of ASB was a logical and recognised potential outcome 
of Bernie, even if not its aim. Post-intervention liaison with the police later revealed that crime 
figures for Tonypandy showed a significant reduction in all forms of ASB during the Bernie 
intervention. Across Tonypandy’s four police beats the rate of recorded ASB fell by an average 
(mean) of 18% between March and April (when Bernie became active), whereas in the previous 
two years it had increased (by 33.5% on average). Comparable figures for 2010 for Aberdare 
were unavailable, but anecdotal evidence suggests they experienced no such reduction and that 
there were no other local factors were identified that could explain the localised wider drop in 
ASB within Tonypandy.  
Type 2. Serendipitous (Positive/Unforeseen).  
The potential of Bernie activities to distract youngsters from other forms of ASB was anticipated, 
but the potential for maintaining reduced levels of other ASB was not. Levels of ASB in 
Tonypandy in 2010 remained at around 37% lower than the historical average for the previous 
two years during the two months after the intervention ended. For the 2011 extension of Bernie to 
Caerphilly, one of the additional authorities, the effect on overall crime and ASB in the ward area 
in which Bernie operated are shown in Table 2. 
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Crime Reduction During 
Bernie Intervention 
Reduction during 
following 6 weeks 
Anti-social behaviour 21% 38% 
Burglaries 53% 11% 
Violent crime 24% 6% 
Vehicle theft 18% 6% 
Overall crime 14% 11% 
 Table 2: Caerphilly Crime Statistics During/Post Bernie 2011 
Bernie activities that promoted the anti-fires message and encouraged youngsters to value 
their local environment, along with the intention of making fire-setting less of a social norm, 
were part of the strategy to maintain a reduction in fire-setting post-intervention. The persistent 
drop of other ASBs once the ‘distractions’ had ceased suggests a long-term ‘spillover effect’ 
from being encouraged to value your local environment that perhaps made youngsters feel more 
connected to their locality and therefore less likely to engage in ASB and other crimes. Spillover 
effects in marketing have been investigated for pro-environmental behaviours, producing 
conflicting evidence that engaging in one ‘good’ behavior can make individuals both more likely 
(via spillovers) and less likely (via compensation) to engage in others (see Thøgersen & Ölander, 
2003). The claims for such positive spillovers for Bernie between ASBs could be argued as 
paradoxical, since fire-setting was unexpectedly viewed by participants as joining in with the 
local community through an activity that had become traditional, not reacting against it. Possibly 
in reducing involvement in an anti-social but widely practiced behaviour, perceived as taking part 
in the community, it made youngsters less likely to engage in behaviours that would further 
disconnect them. Exploring the extent to which such an intervention succeeds simply through its 
distraction value, and the extent to which it shifts long-term attitudes towards the behavior, or 
creates an improved sense of community cohesion, could be a useful focus for further research.  
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Improved SWFRS community relationships. 
Bernie’s goals focused on behaviour within the community and working relationships between 
stakeholder organisations. An unexpected result was that it also changed the dynamics of the 
relationship between SWFRS and the wider Tonypandy community (Peattie et al., 2012). It might 
be assumed that firefighter-community relationships are relatively unproblematic compared with 
a service like the police. However research suggests that this relationship can be tense for several 
reasons (Matheson, 2012), including associations with authority figures, a perceived status as 
‘outsiders’ with a presence viewed as intrusive, and even resentment linked to complex sexual 
and gender politics/roles. Bernie built a more positive relationship with the community, partly via 
the high-visibility anti-grassfire patrols that provided the ‘control’ aspect of the intervention, 
which made a positive impact in the community particularly when combined with the 
firefighters’ direct involvement in the youth activities as the following quote illustrates: 
The initial stages (of the patrols) - we were treated with a little bit of suspicion, 
occasionally swearing was mouthed at you from behind lounge windows ..... then, after a 
period of days, the hostility started to peter out and in fact we started to get waved at. Then 
when the youngsters (had) the fortnight of activities at the fire station, we were no longer 
just getting waved at, it was – ‘Hiya Mick, hiya Simon, hiya Mel!’  So they got to know 
names and faces and all the hostile welcomes that we got initially did kind of fade away.  
We were there to be a presence in the area, (but) then we stopped just being a presence and 
we started to pull over and stop and say ‘Hi’ to the kids, ‘What you been up to? Been to 
school? What’s school like? ... and you start to engage and talk and then its ‘Oh we’d better 
go’, and we’d wave and go, and maybe we gave a handful of key rings out, but we got that 
dialogue going which went from ‘f… off’  to ‘Hiya Mick how are you?’  
                                                                                                (Senior SWFRS Manager A).  
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For local youngsters the firefighters became ‘real people’ rather than an abstract public 
sector resource whose number they considerably over-estimated. For the youngsters who 
attended the ‘Firefighter for a Day’ activity, they gained an appreciation of the sheer physical 
effort involved in trying to fight a fire up a mountain in ‘full kit’: 
It was great fun. It shows what people put firefighters through.                             
(Firefighter for a Day Participant, 15)    
For the local adults in Tonypandy, Bernie turned the local firefighters into a welcome and 
visible presence actively tackling and preventing an ASB previously seen as a nuisance, but 
which was accepted as virtually unpreventable. The regular community patrols allowed 
interaction with residents, who were happy to see some action being taken to tackle the fire-
setting problem.  
The extent to which Bernie generated benefits linked, not just to behaviour change, but to 
improved stakeholder relationships and community dynamics reflects macro-social marketing’s 
quest to shape the context of behaviour change to create societal change (Kennedy, 2015). This 
also underlines Fry and Polonsky’s (2004) point that unintended consequences should be sought 
beyond the marketer/target market relationship to encompass relationships amongst all relevant 
stakeholders. It also reinforces the argument that social marketing can benefit from taking more 
of a relationship marketing and macromarketing perspective (Dholakia, 1984; Hastings, 2003; 
Peattie & Peattie, 2003) to confront ‘wicked’ and complex problems of the sort ASBs represent 
(Kennedy, 2015). As Kennedy (2015) argues in exploring the notion of macro-social marketing, 
effecting change partly depends on going beyond targeting individuals to achieve community 
involvement and mobilization and the demonstration of benefits at a community level. A 
relationship management approach was never formally planned or discussed for Bernie, yet much 
of its success reflected strengthened relationships between SWFRS and the local community, the 
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local college, the youngsters as the primary target, and the other stakeholder organisations. This 
reflects Polit’s (2012) view that social marketing should go beyond a focus on behaviour change 
for a particular target group to create mutual understanding amongst all stakeholders, creating 
opportunities to foster trust between groups that may have previously experienced distrust.  
Social media impacts 
The social media component of the Bernie campaign was intended to communicate with local 
children about the issue of fire-setting and promote the intervention and the diversionary 
activities available. It was unexpectedly successful in its scope and nature. By 2012 Bernie had 
gained 2624 Facebook friends and nearly 2000 Twitter followers including parents as well as 
children. It also became more of a forum for debate and discussion than had originally been 
envisaged, with broader communications implications:  
During one live Bernie chat, two girls made a public apology for having been involved 
 and we went on to re-engage them with the project ….. 
                       (Bernie Communications Manager).  
 
Changed SWFRS operational behaviour 
Bernie sought to reduce fires through behavioural change amongst local youngsters. However, 
one insight uncovered was that local firefighter behaviour had been inadvertently encouraging 
fire-setting. Operational practice was to arrive at grassfires employing fire appliance lights and 
sirens which were unnecessary in the countryside, and which for youngsters added to the 
‘excitement’ benefits of lighting a fire:  
 A fire-engine turning up with lights flashing – that’s an added bonus  (Firesetter, 15) 
Operationally it was also common practice to allow local volunteers to employ flails to help 
control the grassfires. This meant local youths who set a fire and waited for firefighters to arrive 
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were sometimes rewarded with the excitement of being able to act as volunteer firefighters. These 
insights resulted in operational practices being changed to approach grassfires without fanfare 
and to clear the area of youngsters rather than using them to help control the fire.  
Changes within the sponsoring organisation 
The social marketing literature acknowledges that adopting social marketing practices and 
philosophies can impact sponsoring organisations (Polit, 2012). However the focus is often on 
negative outcomes, such as the potential for perceived conflicts between social marketing’s 
commercially derived language and techniques and the social mission and culture of the 
organisation, leading to a backlash amongst staff (Polit, 2012). An unexpected result from the 
evaluation interviews was that Bernie changed the internal working and mindset of SWFRS staff 
in several ways. Firefighters’ attitude towards grassfires changed. Before there was largely 
acceptance, viewing fire-setting as an intractable community behaviour. Once Bernie 
demonstrated that something could be done, the firefighters became increasingly intolerant of the 
behaviour:  
Previously we used to look at deliberate grassfires as ‘Everybody sort of accepted it. It 
was almost ‘Well its grassfire season again, I’m going to be busy ... let’s get ready for it’ 
.... I think that has now changed to - ‘Oh it’s grassfire season, let’s do something about 
this’.  (SWFRS Bernie Project Manager) 
The success of Bernie in changing the downstream target’s behavior led to the type of 
downstream-to-upstream/target-to-sponsor influence outlined by Newton, Newton & Rep (2016) 
by changing the sponsor’s perceptions and behaviours:   
The way the organisation went was from –‘Here we go, another soft engineering process 
to try and beat this arson’, to – ‘This is actually working!’  So it changed the perception of 
what Community Fire Safety & Prevention do.            (Senior SWFRS Manager A). 
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This then led to a change in the SWFRS mindset about how they approached other types 
of prevention projects (see Peattie et al., 2012) including directly influencing their strategies for 
Bonfire Night safety. As one SWFRS Manager commented: ‘(Bernie) has changed the type of 
questions we ask for any project we tackle’. Such comments almost perfectly echo Polit’s (2012, 
p. 130) observation about social marketing that ‘These new organizational practices complicate 
and change how an organization conducts all aspects of its work’. So although Bernie aimed to 
change a specific ASB within the community, it ultimately also changed the broader thinking and 
management practices of the fire service working within it (and the wider region). Other changes 
in management practices are explored in greater detail in (Peattie, et al., 2012). One interesting 
and unexpected example of how interventions can impact upstream actor interactions (Newton et 
al., 2016) was revealed by one senior manager (B) expressing that the marketing vocabulary 
they’d gained from involvement in Bernie would make the service more confident in approaching 
businesses as potential future project partners.  
A final unintended organisational consequence of the intervention was the extent to which 
the Bernie ‘mascot’, designed to appeal to and communicate with youngsters, became a vehicle 
for internal communication and identification within SWFRS: 
I think it was something that everyone could relate to and certainly locally within the 
valleys.  A sheep is very much Welsh, its non-descript in that it wasn’t human …it was 
like a new member of staff that everybody associated with, I think Bernie has become a 
member of the team.  I think it was that everybody had a commonality and Bernie became 
that commonality, and in my opinion Bernie has done more than anyone of us could have 
individually done.  Bernie is now a member of the Department and reached and spoken to 
more people than any of us could ever have done. (SWFRS Bernie Project Manager) 
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Extending Bernie’s reach 
Another unintended consequence of the success of the Bernie intervention was the extent to 
which learning from it was adopted in other spheres. Beyond the obvious application of lessons 
for other fire services and fire-related ASBs Bernie was: 
 Presented to an audience of Commanders & Chief Officers from the combined Armed 
Services of UK & USA at the National Defense Academy Shrivenham as an example of 
best practice in ‘Winning Hearts and Minds’ in the wake of experiences in Iraq and 
Afganistan; 
 Used as an exemplar of an evidence-based approach in public services by the Equality & 
Human Rights Commission of Wales; 
 Used by the Wales Audit Office as an example of best practise in consultation and 
engagement for public services; 
Type 3. Contingencies (Negative/Foreseeable)  
The potential for a backlash ‘boomerang’ effect (Pechmann & Slater, 2005) where children 
reacted to the campaign message of not setting fires, by setting more of them, was a concern from 
the beginning of the project. This concern was particularly related to the control element of the 
campaign stressing that fire-setting was a crime and highlighting the risk of punishment in 
posters and via social media. However, this was seen as crucial to communicate that the behavior 
was not ‘harmless fun’ or ‘risk free’ for the individuals involved, both common opinions revealed 
in the formative research. There is some anecdotal comment from SWFRS staff that some 
younger children set fires as a defiant response to the Bernie campaign (Jollands, Morris & 
Moffat, 2011), but generally the success in reducing fire-setting overall suggests there was only 
modest reactance against it.  
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Two concerns that were foreseen focused on the reactions of both the (predominantly 
male) firefighters and male local youngsters to the campaign. There were concerns that since the 
Bernie branding was locally known to have been created by a team of girls (via a well-publicised 
competition), whether it would fail to connect with young males, who were the main group 
responsible for firesetting. For the firefighters, there were concerns about a potential lack of 
enthusiasm for a campaign focusing on activities less challenging than fighting fires. These two 
concerns were addressed by making many of the distraction activities overtly ‘macho’ with 
elements of (controlled) risk:  
Well we militarised it …it was SAS bushcraft, that’s how it was sold as very macho.  The 
(SWFRS) culture desperately tries to get away from that kind of thing, so we were going 
against our own developing culture to reintroduce that macho male dominated thing 
because they are the very ones we know who are setting the fires.  We accepted everyone 
boys and girls alike and it began with map reading. (Senior SWFRS Manager A) 
Activities like bushcraft, abseiling and ‘firefighter for a day’ aimed to replace the 
excitement that fire-setting provided for the youngsters whilst providing the outdoor experience, 
physical exertion and camaraderie that staff found rewarding about fighting grassfires. 
Type 4. Surprises (Negative/Unforeseen)  
A major surprise was a type of counter-informative unintended consequence as described by 
Pechmann and Slater (2005). Although the number of fires experienced in Tonypandy during and 
post-intervention significantly declined (compared both to immediately prior to the intervention 
and to previous years), some 15% of local children in the follow up survey reported perceiving an 
increase in fires. This is reminiscent of the outcome of two environmentally-orientated workplace 
social marketing interventions reported by Gregory-Smith et al. (2015). Here success in 
improving behaviour (in saving paper and energy) was paradoxically accompanied by a general 
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worker perception that their behaviour was poorer than pre-intervention.The most likely 
explanation may involve sensitising individuals to previously taken-for-granted behaviours and 
consequences, in Bernie’s case turning grassfires from an accepted background factor in local life 
to a focus for attention and concern. This is also suggested by the fact that during the intervention 
although the number of fires went down, the rate of reporting fires went up. So ironically 
Bernie’s success resulted in members of the target group viewing it as a failure in terms of its 
primary purpose, even if they thought it was successful in highlighting the issue and enlivening 
their Easter. 
 The unforeseen extent to which the social media campaign caught the local population’s 
imagination also created one specific surprise:  
….we had one fire started up behind some houses and we had people logging on to say 
“There’s a fire!” so Bernie had become the first point of contact.   
                       (Bernie Communications Manager).  
This demonstrates the extent to which the locals had come to associate Bernie with the 
grassfires issue, even if it was unexpected and undesirable from an operational emergency 
response perspective. 
 
Implications for evaluating unintended consequences 
Morell (2005) discusses in detail the challenges that unintended consequences pose for those 
seeking to evaluate social change interventions. Within social marketing the importance of 
evaluating such consequences is recognised (Salmon & Cho, 2007), however they ‘typically go 
unmeasured’ (Friedman et al., 2016, p.99). This is understandable since evaluation processes 
usually begin by developing metrics that reflect the objectives of the intervention, which 
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naturally risks excluding anything unforeseen. To ensure that unintended consequences aren’t 
overlooked, an explicit set of responsibilities to identify them should be included in the 
intervention design, as was the case with the ‘Healthy Together Victoria’ anti-obesity campaign 
described by Venturini (2016). Brace-Govan (2015, p.114) argues that ‘The lack of research on 
the deleterious effects of social marketing is a seriously neglected area’ and that higher quality 
evaluations that encompass unintended consequences are vital to allow greater critical reflection 
aiding the development of the field.  
The unplanned organisational changes observable within SWFRS as the sponsoring 
organisation, and the beneficial but unforeseen changes to their relationship with the community 
beyond the intervention’s primary target audience, highlight the importance of evaluations 
exploring impacts beyond the primary goals and target audience. The potential for ‘community 
multiplier effects’ and the need to consider a wide range of stakeholders in evaluations is 
acknowledged within social marketing (Brace-Govan, 2015; Bryant, et al., 2000; Lister & 
Merritt, 2013). However, such broadenings of the scope of evaluations still tend to be in relation 
to the intended (singular) behavioural change. Spotswood et al. (2011) highlight the risks of 
evaluatory myopia whereby interventions with overall positive effects (from a broad social 
capital perspective) are judged as failures in achieving narrow behaviour change goals. They 
view this as particularly significant in deprived communities (such as the Bernie communities) 
where public authorities tend to target single behaviours without understanding the role of the 
underlying social context (Spotswood et al., 2011). 
If interventions can generate unforeseen social impacts (both positive and negative) that go 
beyond the aggregation of individual behaviour changes, and impacts that contribute to the 
agendas of social organisations other than the intervention’s sponsor, it all adds to the evaluation 
challenges for social marketers. These challenges are exacerbated by funding squeezes for 
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sponsors which may restrict the resources available for evaluation and focus them on metrics 
linked to cost effectiveness and primary behavioural goals (Polit, 2012).  
Evaluation as a topic is gaining increased attention in social marketing, and there are some 
sophisticated solutions being proposed, such as Biroscak et al.’s (2014) system dynamics 
modelling based approach for community interventions. Despite the sophistication and apparent 
comprehensiveness of such approaches, they depend on the underlying systems model accounting 
for unintended consequences, which is difficult if they are also unforeseen. The risk with 
modelling approaches is that in the quest to visually represent the complex social processes that 
generate unintended consequences (Morell, 2005; Vernon, 1979) they simplify and delineate in 
ways that focus on the known, expected and intended dynamics of the system. A reason that 
Bernie was successful in revealing unintended consequences was its status as an academic action 
research project as well as a practical intervention. The qualitative methods employed of on-
going observation, reflexive dialogue between stakeholders and follow-up interviews with a wide 
range of stakeholders helped to reveal and understand complex, unexpected and unintended 
consequences in ways that quantitative evaluative research would not. When applying such 
methods, the four types of unintended consequence outlined in this paper and the simple 
diagnostic matrix can be used to consider different stakeholders (e.g. primary audience, 
sponsoring organisation, community stakeholders, upstream organisations) and the 
interrelationships between them, as a planning tool to aid the identification, management and 
evaluation of unintended consequences. 
 The evolution of the Bernie intervention also hinted at a reason why the focus of the 
(albeit limited) consideration of unintended consequences in social marketing is so strongly on 
the negative. As an intervention develops and learning occurs, when unintended positive 
consequences are revealed, they can quickly become incorporated into the intervention, its 
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rationale and its intentions. So as the unexpected success of the social media elements of the 
Bernie campaign were revealed, so the role and expectations of social media use expanded. As 
the second year’s iteration of Bernie to further unitary authorities was developed, the potential for 
wider ASB improvements was used as part of the case to secure stakeholder support:  
 I would certainly go back to the partnership table, (and) that package (of wider benefits) 
 will be taken to the 4 Unitary Authorities with the successes.  Do you wish to share as a 
 partner, and it will be a big push towards the Police, a big push towards Youth Services – 
 do you want to be part of our success?  (Senior SWFRS Manager B) 
Therefore positive unintended benefits appear to have a ‘half-life’ and once identified 
become absorbed within the logic, conduct and evaluation of an intervention as it evolves and 
therefore become no longer visible as ‘unintended’.  
In a systematic review of social marketing literature Truong (2014, p. 26) highlights the 
need to learn from intervention failures and ‘side effects’ as a key future research priority. Such 
research can help social marketers to avoid wasting scare resources, generating negative 
outcomes for their target markets, providing ammunition for critics through negative publicity, 
and putting future funding at risk. However, this perhaps also needs to be complemented by 
further awareness of, and research into, the potential for elements of success that originate as 
unintended and unplanned and that can bolster the case for social marketing interventions and 
their effectiveness. 
 
Conclusions 
Bernie’s success adds to the growing evidence demonstrating social marketing’s potential to 
tackle non-health ASBs, including apparently intractable behaviours linked to ingrained social 
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norms and traditions. It demonstrates social marketing’s potential to address fire-related 
behaviours and (in this case unintentionally) to change other ASBs within communities. Bernie 
demonstrated the benefits of using social de-marketing for ASBs, and did so by combining the 
three potentially effective approaches to tackling youth ASBs identified by Martin et al., (2010): 
‘Communicating with the public about young people, anti-social behaviour and crime’, ‘Youth-
focussed work’ (including positive and diversionary activities), and ‘Bringing young people and 
adults together’. 
 Bernie also demonstrates the potential for learning across different types of ASB context. 
It benefitted from advice from staff behind the successful ‘Sub21’ anti-teenage drinking 
campaign (Lloyd, Tafoya & Merritt., 2015) since the behaviours shared similarities, and the final 
intervention borrowed certain aspects (like the use of hoodies as incentives). Grassfire-setting 
however is an unusual ASB involving youngsters which, unlike almost all others, takes place 
outside of the physical communities it affects. ASB enforcement measures (such as dispersal 
orders) are based on an assumption that ASB nuisances are caused (mostly) by young people 
congregating in large groups within the community (Hodgkinson & Tilley, 2011). They are also 
largely geared towards being able to identify ‘ring-leaders’ and targeting them with measures 
(such as ASBOs). The fire-setting behaviour was typified by small groups gathering outside of 
the community in the local countryside, making it less likely for the behaviour to be identified as 
anti-social at the time it occurs, and making ring-leaders hard to identify and target.  
The reflections presented in this paper, relating to both the planned and unplanned social 
and organisational impacts of Bernie as a social marketing intervention, have some significant 
implications. The demonstrable presence of unplanned benefits, such as spill-over reductions in 
other ASBs and crimes, raises interesting questions about social marketing evaluations. In 
commercial marketing, success is judged against an organisation’s own agenda on measures such 
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as sales targets, market penetration, customer satisfaction, profitability or progress in customer 
relationships. For social marketing the evaluation net must spread wider. The growing emphasis 
on local coalitions and community-based interventions is resulting in a broadening of the range of 
stakeholders and impacts being addressed by evaluations. The ‘Community-Based Prevention 
Marketing’ approach (Bryant, et al., 2000) represents one example of a more holistic approach. 
However, as Clark et al. (2010) note for community coalitions’ work in health, such holistic 
evaluations of coalitions’ effectiveness in policy, system, and environmental changes have so far 
been limited, and there is a tendency for them to rely on instruments like computer-assisted 
questionnaires which may fail to capture unexpected effects. For Bernie the involvement of a 
range of community stakeholders, coupled with the project’s dual identity as a practical 
intervention and the subject of wider academic action research (including a focus on internal 
organisational impacts), encouraged the adoption of a wide-ranging approach to evaluation and 
follow-up that helped to reveal and evaluate both intended and unintended consequences.  
Finally the experience of Bernie underlines the need for a more holistic and relationship-
based approach to understanding and evaluating social marketing interventions, which also has 
implications for their commissioning. Exploring what types of secondary and perhaps unexpected 
impacts amongst stakeholders might accrue from a campaign, or the ways in which conducting an 
intervention could change the attitudes and behaviour of the sponsoring organisations as well as 
the target audience, could inform useful questions to be addressed during initial intervention 
planning. This would increase the chances of evaluation measures being established within 
projects that can assess these broader impacts and take a step towards capturing the full value of 
interventions and the planned and unplanned social changes they create. 
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Table 1. Grassfires in Tonypandy and Aberdare in Spring 2010, relative to 2004-2009.
 
 
              
    Fortnight before Easter Easter fortnight Fortnight after Easter  Six weeks combined 
Year  Tonypandy Aberdare Ratio Tonypandy Aberdare Ratio Tonypandy Aberdare Ratio Tonypandy Aberdare Ratio 
                    
2004  30 14   22 21  17 19   69 54   
2005  18 17   7 5  19 7   44 29   
2006  30 27   27 46  33 24   90 97   
2007  22 33   123 143  61 62   206 238   
2008  5 2   20 18  19 17   44 37   
2009  36 55   18 27  16 15   70 97   
2004-2009  141 148 0.953 217 260 0.835 165 144 1.146 523 552 0.947 
                    
2010  28 21 1.333 11 19 0.579 25 84 0.298 64 124 0.516 
                    
Adjusted ratio     1.400   0.694    0.260   0.545 
                    
95% confidence Lower    0.763   0.328    0.158   0.394 
Limits Upper    2.565   1.469    0.427   0.753 
                    
Chi-square     1.17   0.63    30.16   14.96 
P-value       0.28     0.43     <0.001     <0.001 
              
 
 
